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In two studies, the authors investigated 2- and 3-year-old children’s awareness of the normative structure
of conventional games. In the target conditions, an experimenter showed a child how to play a simple rule
game. After the child and the experimenter had played for a while, a puppet came (controlled by a 2nd
experimenter), asked to join in, and then performed an action that constituted a mistake in the game. In
control conditions, the puppet performed the exact same action as in the experimental conditions, but the
context was different such that this act did not constitute a mistake. Children’s normative responses to
the puppet’s acts (e.g., protest, critique, or teaching) were scored. Both age groups performed more
normative responses in the target than in the control conditions, but the 3-year-olds did so on a more
explicit level. These studies demonstrate in a particularly strong way that even very young children have
some grasp of the normative structure of conventional activities.
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Human social life is organized by cultural practices and insti-
tutions with conventional and normative structures. The conven-
tional dimension of cultural activities specifies what one typically
does in this context, whereas the normative dimension specifies
more forcefully what one ought to do.
A number of interview studies have demonstrated that preschool
children have some understanding of conventionality. For exam-
ple, 5-year-olds distinguish conventional rules (e.g., “one can’t
take a bath in clothes”) from laws of nature (e.g., “humans cannot
fly”) and know that the former but not the latter can potentially be
broken (Kalish, 1998). Preschoolers also distinguish conventional
rules from moral prescriptions, saying that conventional rules are
more alterable and context relative (e.g., Nucci & Nucci, 1982;
Smetana, 1981; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1983).
Preschoolers also understand something of the conventionality
of artifact functions. Although both natural and artificial objects
can have many affordances—they can be used for many pur-
poses—artifacts are what they are because they are designed and
conventionally used for specific purposes. Artifacts are “for”
something; they are thus to be used in specific ways and are
“broken” when they cannot fulfill their function. In interview
studies it has been found that from at least 5 years of age children
distinguish mere affordances from the proper, conventional func-
tions of objects—what they are “for” (e.g., German & Johnson,
2002; Kelemen, 1999; Matan & Carey, 2001).
Interview methods such as these cannot be used with younger
children, however, and so other measures are required. Some
researchers have therefore used imitation as a measure of young
children’s understanding of conventional normative practices.
From around 9 to 12 months of age, infants imitate simple instru-
mental actions with objects (e.g., Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello,
1998), and from around 14 to 18 months of age, imitation of
instrumental acts becomes highly systematic and rational. For
example, infants of this age differentially imitate intentional, but
not superficially similar, accidental acts (Carpenter, Akhtar, &
Tomasello, 1998), and they interpret one and the same behavior
either as a rational means to an end only or as a rational end in
itself, depending on the context, and differentially imitate accord-
ingly (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kira ´ly, 2002). In the course of the
2nd year, infants also begin to imitate both symbolic pretense acts
(e.g., Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2004, 2005) and conven-
tional linguistic acts (e.g., Tomasello, 2000), and they expect
others to use these symbols and words in the same conventional
ways (e.g., Baldwin & Tomasello, 1998).
Although young children’s imitation of conventional action
forms is suggestive, it is not enough to establish that they are aware
of the normative dimension as well. They might simply copy what
they see someone else doing with an object, or what is usually
done with it, without understanding the act as what is to be done
conventionally, that is, without understanding that there are “right”
and “wrong” ways to do it (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello & Ra-
koczy, 2003). Casler and Kelemen (2005) thus used a new measure
Hannes Rakoczy, Felix Warneken, and Michael Tomasello, Department
of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for
Evolutionary Anthropology.
This work was supported by a Dilthey Fellowship of the Volkswagen
and Thyssen Foundations to Hannes Rakoczy. We would like to thank
Claudia Salomo, Antonia Misch, Manja Teich, Elena Rossi, Berenike
Herrmann, and Maxim Bannack for helping in recruiting children and
collecting data. Thank you to all daycare centers and children for their
friendly cooperation.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Hannes
Rakoczy, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Depart-
ment of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Deutscher Platz 6,
D-04103, Leipzig, Germany. E-mail: rakoczy@eva.mpg.de
Developmental Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 44, No. 3, 875–881 0012-1649/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0012-1649.44.3.875
875that went beyond mere imitation of actions with artifacts. They
found that children as young as 2 years of age not only imitated
instrumental actions with novel artifacts but also showed func-
tional fixedness to the imitated usage and expected others to use
the same object for the same purposes. Potentially even stronger
evidence for early normative awareness comes from anecdotal
reports by Kagan (1981), who found that during the 2nd year
children begin to be concerned with deviations from normative
standards applied to artifacts and that they actually comment on
this verbally, for example, by calling malfunctioning objects “bro-
ken.”
However, although such things as functional fixedness,o ra n
expectation that others will use objects in similar ways, and com-
menting on malfunctioning go beyond simple imitation in impor-
tant ways, they still leave open the question of whether children
this young really grasp the functions of the objects in the strong
normative sense (“This is what it’s for,” “This is how it should be
used”) or whether they are merely tracking statistical regularities
(“This is how such objects are usually used”). To address this
question, more direct, active indexes of the child’s normative
awareness are needed, such as protest against deviant usage of the
artifacts by others (“This is not what it’s for!”).
In the current studies, therefore, we used a new action-based
methodology to investigate young children’s awareness of the
normative structure of noninstrumental, game-like acts involving
the assignment of conventional functions to objects. Games are the
standard example of activities that involve the assignment of
specific, strongly conventional functions to objects or actions,
typically called status functions, which are based on constitutive
rules (Searle, 1969, 1995). That is to say, whereas tools have usage
functions—causal functions we ascribe to objects when we design
them or use them instrumentally—objects and actions can also
have status functions, which are assigned to them as a matter of
convention only (i.e., not on the basis of their causal properties),
and without this assignment they could not fulfill that function.
1 A
certain shape of wood, for example, counts as a queen in the game
of chess, and moving the queen in certain ways counts as attacking
another piece. An object or action thus has a certain status function
only by virtue of the collective agreement that it does in a certain
context, the formula that expresses this being “X counts as a Y in
context C” (as in “This piece of wood counts as a queen in chess”
or “Moving this piece in such ways counts as attacking in chess”).
The normative dimension of status functions is that the object
ought to be treated and the actions performed appropriately in the
context of the game.
In our studies, an adult showed 2- and 3-year-old children
simple game actions, which they played together for some while.
A third person (a puppet) then entered and (in the target condition)
performed an action which was inappropriate given the structure of
the game (i.e., a mistake). Children’s responses to these acts, in
particular protest and correction, were investigated as indicators of
their awareness of the normative structure of the game. Control
conditions were administered in which the puppet performed the
same behavior, but this did not constitute a mistake. Comparing
children’s responses to the exact same behavior in the experimen-
tal conditions (where it was a mistake) and control conditions
(where it was not a mistake) thus allowed us to rule out that
children intervened due to irrelevant reasons (e.g., simple prefer-
ences for one action).
Study 1
Method
Twenty-four 3-year-olds (35–38 months, mean age  36
months; 10 boys, 14 girls) and twenty-four 2-year-olds (25–28
months, mean age  26 months; 12 boys, 12 girls) were tested. In
this and all other studies, children were recruited from urban
daycare centers, came from mixed socioeconomic backgrounds,
and were native German speakers. In a within-subjects design,
each child received two experimental and two control tasks in
alternating order. Across children, the order of the tasks and the
assignment of a given task to the control or experimental condition
were counterbalanced. Before the four main target tasks, children
were given three warm-up tasks in which the puppet, Max, made
instrumental mistakes (e.g., forgot to use a necessary means to an
end), in order to familiarize them with the puppet and with situa-
tions where mistakes happen and they can intervene. Children’s
interventions were coded and scored as explicit when the child told
Max what to do, what not to do, or what was missing (such as
“Take that one” or “Not this way!”) and as implicit when the child
just pointed to or gave Max the missing object (reliability: 
.95). Over the three tasks, for each child sum scores (0–3) for
implicit and explicit responses were computed.
The common structure of the target tasks in the experimental
and control conditions was as follows (see Table 1; see the sup-
plemental materials for movies of the different conditions). In the
absence of Max, the first experimenter brought out some partly
novel objects and performed two actions (A1 and A2) with them
(model phase), whereupon it was the child’s turn (action phase).
Then Max came back and performed an action (A2) with the
objects (test phase). The crucial differences were as follows: (a) In
the experimental condition, A1 was marked as the correct game
action (labeled by a novel verb), and A2 was marked as an
accidental mistake. In the control condition, in contrast, both A1
and A2 were marked neutrally as equally possible options and not
labeled as any specific game actions. (b) In the experimental
condition, before his performance of A2, Max announced that he
was going to join the game as well (by using the novel verb),
whereas in the control condition he neutrally announced that he
was going to show the child something. In one game called daxing
(modeled on pool), for example, the objects were a Styrofoam
board with a gutter at one end, a building block, and a wooden
1 It is notoriously difficult to draw the line between instrumental and
conventional activities, as many have both instrumental and conventional
elements. Board games are paradigm examples of conventional games, but
games like pool are somewhat instrumental—the goal is to get the ball in
the hole and using the queue is the means—but pool has conventional rules
designating the status of different balls, for example, as well. For present
purposes we thus assume a continuum of activities ranging from purely
instrumental ones to clearly conventional ones and a corresponding con-
tinuum of functions ranging from clear usage functions to clear status
functions. Although the actions used in Study 2A are more like board
games and thus involve clear status functions, those in Studies 1 and 2B are
more like pool and thus more intermediate cases.
876 BRIEF REPORTSstick and a small piece of wood that could be put together to form
a kind of roulette rake or bat. One action (A1) was to put the
wooden pieces together to form a bat, put the building block on the
Styrofoam board, and push the block across the board with the bat
so that it falls into the gutter. The alternative action (A2) was to lift
the board at one side so that the block slid into the gutter. In the test
phase Max performed A2 twice, with each performance lasting
approximately 15 s.
All sessions were coded from videotape by a single observer. A
second independent observer coded a random sample of 20% of all
the sessions for reliability. For coding, the test phase of each task
was divided into 6 subphases (before, during, and after each of
Max’s act tokens). For each phase, all relevant responses and
utterances of the child were carefully described and given one of
the following codes. A code of 1 was given for a normative
protest: The child clearly intervened in a normative way, making
use of normative vocabulary (e.g., “No! It does not go like this!”).
A code of 2 was given for an imperative protest: The child
expressed an imperative to Max without using normative vocab-
ulary, either in the negative (e.g., “No! Not in this hole!”) or in the
positive (e.g., “Take the stick!”). (For reliability, the weighted 
.88.) Each task then got as its code the highest category code that
appeared in its subphases.
The logic of the coding scheme is the following: Whereas
normative protest itself (by definition) applies to distinctively
normative interventions, imperative protest as such is more am-
biguous and, in itself, does not present conclusive evidence for
normative awareness. For example, imperative protest might sim-
ply reflect children’s preference for certain actions over others.
However, if children produce this kind of protest in response to the
exact same behavior more in the experimental condition (when the
behavior was a mistake) than in the control condition (when it was
not a mistake), this plausibly constitutes more indirect evidence
that children do not intervene just due to preferences but specifi-
cally in response to mistakes.
Results and Discussion
The mean sum scores over the two tasks per condition for the
different response categories are depicted in Figure 1. First, a 2
(age)  2 (condition) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the mean
sum scores of normative protest was computed. It yielded a main
effect of condition, F(1, 46)  11.83, p  .01, p
2  .21; a main
effect of age, F(1, 46)  18.55, p  .01, p
2  .29; and an Age 
Condition interaction effect, F(1, 46)  5.26, p  .03, p
2  .10.
Planned comparisons revealed that only the 3-year-olds, t(23) 
3.32, p  .01, p
2  .32, but not the 2-year-olds, t(23)  1.14, p 
.26, p
2  .05, performed more normative protest responses in the
experimental compared to the control condition.
On a more liberal measure (mean sum score of tasks per con-
dition in which children produced normative protest or imperative
protest responses), a 2 (age)  2 (condition) ANOVA yielded only
a main effect of condition, F(1, 46)  11.98, p  .01, p
2  .21.
In sum, the 3-year-olds showed a clear understanding of the
normative structure of joint game actions: When a puppet made a
mistake in the game context (experimental condition), they often
explicitly corrected him, but they did so rarely (and significantly
less) when the puppet performed the same behavior in a context
where it was not a mistake (control condition). The 2-year-olds
showed a similar pattern of responses but on a less explicit level.
The number of experimental trials with normative or imperative
protest (0–2) was correlated with the number of warm-up trials
with explicit or implicit intervention (0–3; rs  .46, p  .01;
partial correlation controlling for age, r  .32, p  .02). That is,
part of the variance of children’s protests in the target tasks, both
within and across age groups, reflects not only variance in norma-
tive protest ability as such but variance in children’s general
willingness to intervene in response to the puppet (as measured in
a simpler context in the warm-up tasks) as well. In particular,
children who protested little in the target tasks might have noticed
the puppet’s mistakes but refrained from protesting because of a
general (e.g., shyness-related) reluctance to interfere with others.
Study 2A
In Study 1, young children indicated an awareness of the nor-
mative structure of simple joint game-like actions. However, these
actions had only a rudimentary game structure and were rather
intermediate cases on the continuum between clear conventional
game acts and instrumental acts. One aim of Study 2A, therefore,
Table 1
Schematic Structure of the Tasks in Studies 1, 2A, and 2B
Study and phase Experimental condition Control condition
Study 1
Model phase 1st experimenter performs A1 and A2.A 1 is marked as
“daxing,” A2 as an accidental mistake.
1st experimenter performs A1 and A2.A 1 and A2 are both
marked neutrally.
Action phase Child’s turn Child’s turn
Test phase Max’s announcement: “I’m gonna dax now!” Max’s announcement: “I’m gonna show you something!”
Action: A2 Action: A2
3  mistake 3  mistake
Studies 2A & 2B
Baseline phase Object used in usual way (e.g., building) Objects used in usual way (e.g., building)
Game phase 1st experimenter and child play the “daxing” game 1st experimenter and child play the “daxing” game
Test phase Max’s announcement: “I’m gonna dax as well” Max’s announcement: “I’m not gonna dax. I’m rather
gonna build”
Action: Usual action with object (e.g., building) Action: Usual action with object (e.g., building)
3  mistake 3  mistake
Note. A1  first action; A2  second action.
877 BRIEF REPORTSwas to test children’s normative interventions with actions that on
the instrumental game continuum are more clearly on the conven-
tional game side (clearly involving status and not only usage
functions). Furthermore, children’s understanding of the context-
specificity of the normative implications of game rules was tested
in tasks with a more complex structure. In Study 1, the model
phases of the two conditions were different; the experimental
condition set up a normative framework, labeling one act as the
game act, and so forth. The control condition, in contrast, did not
set up a normative framework or label the acts but just presented
two actions as equal possibilities. Thus, in the experimental con-
dition the children were put in a normative game context, whereas
in the control condition they did not learn a game rule at all.
Formally speaking, “an X counts as a Y in context C” (e.g., “This
act counts as daxing in the context of the game”) is the formula of
status function assignment. That is, only in the context C do the
normative implications of the status rule hold; that is, only in the
context is it mandated to perform an act that counts as daxing. In
the experimental condition the children learned the rule and were
kept in context C (the game) all the time during a given task. In the
control condition, in contrast, they did not learn any rule and were
never in any context C. That is, children never had to take into
account the context-specificity of status-function creation: In the
control condition there simply was no status. In the experimental
condition, however, children did not have to take into account the
context-specificity of status either, because there they were always
in the relevant context.
The present study thus went one step further: Both experimental
and control conditions had the same game phase in which a rule
game was introduced and played. In both conditions, Max per-
formed the same act, inappropriate to the game context. The
crucial difference was now in Max’s announcement: In the exper-
imental condition, he wanted to play the game, that is, put himself
into context C, and thus made a mistake. In the control condition,
in contrast, he announced that he did not want to play the game but
rather to do something else, that is, put himself out of context C
and thus not make a mistake (see Table 1). If children grasp the
context-relative normativity of game rules, they should protest in
the experimental condition but not in the control condition.
Method
Twenty-four 3-year-olds (35–39 months, mean age  37
months; 11 boys, 13 girls) were included in the final sample. The
same within-subjects design as in Study 1 was used, with four
tasks per child. For each task, there were three phases. In the first
phase, the baseline phase, the first experimenter brought out some
known objects (e.g., in one game called daxing, she brought
building blocks: one was half red and half blue, the others were all
blue), and she and the child performed the usual actions with them
(e.g., building). In the second phase, the game phase, the first
experimenter announced “I am going to show you a game now, it’s
called daxing,” brought out additional material (in the daxing case,
a Styrofoam wall with holes of different sizes into which blocks
could be put), and explained the rules (use the red/blue block as a
die; only when blue is up can one put a block into the correspond-
ing hole in the wall). The first experimenter and the child then
played the game, taking turns for a while. In the third phase, the
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Figure 1. Mean sum scores (0–2) of the different forms of protest in the test phase of Study 1.
878 BRIEF REPORTStest phase, Max appeared and performed the action usually done
with the object (in this case, building) twice. The only difference
between the conditions was this: In the experimental condition,
Max announced to play the game, to “dax as well,” whereas in the
control condition he announced to not join the game but rather to
build. The same coding procedure as in Study 1 was used (reli-
ability: weighted .92)
Results and Discussion
The mean sum scores for the different response categories are
depicted in Figure 2 (left side). Both for the strict criterion (only
normative protest) and for the more liberal criterion (normative or
imperative protest), the 3-year-olds performed significantly more
protests in the experimental than in the control condition: strict,
t(23)  4.73, p  .01, p
2  .49; liberal, t(23)  7.40, p  .01,
p
2  .70.
Study 2B
The aim of this study was to test for 2-year-olds’ understanding
of the context-relative normativity of game acts with an analogous
design as that used in Study 2A. However, as pilot testing had
revealed that the tasks used in Study 2A proved too complex for
the 2-year-olds, simplified versions were used.
Method
Twenty-four 2-year-olds (25–29 months, mean age  27
months; 12 boys, 12 girls) were tested. The design was exactly the
same as in Study 2A. Only the games were simplified for the
2-year-olds: Instead of multistep sequences (throw a die 3 results
determine next step 3 perform next step), the game actions
consisted of one step only. For example, in the daxing game, Step
1 (where players used one block as a die) was omitted, and the
game consisted of the players only taking turns in putting one
block at a time into the corresponding holes in the Styrofoam wall.
(See Appendix 3 in the supplemental materials for details.) The
same coding scheme as in Study 2A was used (reliability:
weighted .85).
Results and Discussion
The mean sum scores for the different responses in the test
phase are depicted in Figure 2 (right side). Due to a lack of
normative protests, only the more liberal criterion (normative or
imperative protest) could be used. In this analysis, the 2-year-olds
performed significantly more protests in the experimental than in
the control condition, t(23)  2.63, p  .01, p
2  .23. In sum, the
2-year-olds in this study showed the same pattern of responses as
did the 2-year-olds in Study 1 and a similar pattern as did the
3-year-olds in Studies 1 and 2A, albeit on a less explicit level.
General Discussion
The 3-year-olds in both studies revealed a highly consistent
response pattern. In response to the puppet’s mistakes (in the
experimental condition) they produced both distinctively norma-
tive interventions (e.g., “No! It does not go like this!”) and imper-
ative ones (e.g., “No! Don’t do it that way!”). But they hardly did
so when the puppet performed the same act in the control condi-
tions. That is, that did not disapprove of the action just generally
and for irrelevant reasons (e.g., personal preferences) but specifi-
cally only when it was a mistake. And this pattern was found both
with actions that were somewhere in between purely conventional
game acts and instrumental acts (Study 1) and with clearly con-
ventional game acts (Study 2A). The 3-year-olds in both studies
thus revealed a clear awareness of the normativity created in
simple conventional rule games: In the context of the game, the
assignment of status to objects and actions licenses certain acts and
makes others mistakes. Furthermore, the same act in a different
context does not necessarily count as a mistake—even if the
context is indicated only by the actor’s announcement (to play or
not play the game). The fact that the 2-year-olds showed a quali-
tatively similar response pattern, though with less distinctively
normative interventions, is plausibly interpreted as showing an
analogous normative awareness as in the 3-year-olds, though per-
haps in embryonic form only.
These findings are, in our view, the strongest evidence to date
that young children understand the normative structure of simple
conventional acts involving the creation of status functions. They
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Figure 2. Mean sum scores (0–2) of the different forms of protest in the test phase in Studies 2A (left side)
and 2B (right side).
879 BRIEF REPORTSgo beyond findings that children from their 2nd year imitatively
learn to use novel words or to handle novel tools in conventional
ways and expect others to do so (e.g., Casler & Kelemen, 2005;
Tomasello, 2000). Beyond requiring children to imitate and expect
others to act in usual ways, we required children not only to do as
others did, or to be surprised by deviations from the statistical
norm, but to understand the normative space of warranted and
incorrect acts created in a game context and consequently to
explicitly criticize and/or protest against others’ mistakes.
That is, early in ontogeny, we find the rudiments of what lies at
the heart of uniquely human societal and institutional reality: the
ability to collectively act and treat objects in certain ways, thereby
assigning functions to them and installing a normative framework
of appropriate acts and mistakes (Searle, 1995).
It remains a question for future conceptual and empirical work
as to how exactly young children’s awareness of the normativity in
collective practices is to be characterized. In particular, an out-
standing question in this context is how the present findings relate
to older findings in the Piagetian tradition suggesting that under-
standing societal life is an achievement of middle childhood. Apart
from methodological differences (complex interview questions in
the Piagetian tradition vs. spontaneous action measures in the
present studies), one difference regards potential aspects and levels
of understanding: Piaget (1929, 1932) and much research follow-
ing him focused on children’s understanding of the modal logical
structure of conventionality—that something is conventionally the
way it is, is contingent (“Could cows could have been called
horses?”—Yes, if history had been different). Younger children
tend to fail such questions (e.g., Brook, 1970; Homer, Brockmeier,
Kamawar, & Olson, 2001; Piaget, 1929; Rosenblum & Pinker,
1983), but arguably this might be due to task demands related to
counterfactual reasoning. The focus of the present studies, in
contrast, was not on the counterfactual side of conventional prac-
tices (“Daxing could have been a different game”) but on the
normative side of them (“This is how daxing goes”). One possi-
bility is that young children understand the normative structure of
conventional practices but initially fail to understand the arbitrari-
ness and contingency of such practices (see Kalish, 2005).
Finally, it might be relevant in this context that the practices
used here were games—in contrast to “serious” conventional prac-
tices such as naming or property issues, which were the target of
many studies in the Piagetian tradition (see Rakoczy, 2007; Ra-
koczy & Tomasello, 2007). It has been suggested that games might
be special compared to serious conventional practices in that they
are more isolated activities that do not depend on the rest of social
reality in such holistic ways as does, for example, property (which
is incomprehensible without many juridical and economic notions;
see, e.g., Searle, 1991). Future empirical work is needed to further
explore this suggestion.
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